I miracoli nella filosofia di John Locke

Abstract

The distinction between “above Reason” and “contrary to Reason” is already acquired when Locke makes it his own, taking for granted that it would be the ruin of humanity if we were to reject as contrary to reason everything that we are not able to ascertain exclusively through reason. In fact, what remains inaccessible to our intellect is not necessarily contrary to reason. Therefore, without falling into irrationalist fideism, we must admit that something is true despite its incomprehensibility. Boyle’s exegetical and theological research is a prelude to that of Locke: both appear far from the two extremes of fideism and rationalism, of unconditional obedience to authority and deism. It is not possible to fully understand Locke’s position on miracles without considering his theory of knowledge and the role that sensation plays in it. Miracles, with which God communicates something extraordinary to humans, are sensible facts, which we become aware of in the same way in which we perceive facts of common experience. If God intends to convey some truth to humans, he has two alternatives: either he provides proof of this truth through the exercise of natural reason, on human initiative, or he communicates his will that assent be given by his authority. In this second case, he must inspire in us the persuasion that the revealed proposition comes from him through some sign or proof that does not deceive. The testimony we need is an external sign, which unequivocally convinces us of the divine provenance of certain revelations. These external signs, which convince reason, are miracles. Scripture is revelation in accordance with reason, because it contains the extraordinary signs of the divine origin of the messages and prescriptions reported therein. However, the miracles to which Locke attributes the function of validating revelation are, in turn, validated solely by Scripture: it is easy to recognize in them a petitio principii or circular argument.