Semantical Discordances of Comparison in Law Negatively Defined

Comparative Law as Methodology vs ‘Comparative Law Methodology’ as Tautology

Abstract

Comparative Law’s inadequacy to designate the subject is best exemplified by the following neologism ‘Comparative Law Methodology’. This triptych translates a latent divide between object and method in this discipline which appears to be hermetically unaffected by theoretical developments in other fields. As a result of scholarship’s reluctance to depart from a commonly accepted but contentious phrase, the consecration of this emancipated expression contrastively retains the mainstream designation despite the redundant lexical addition. Morphological observations of the distinctive features of a terminology indicate these can be affected alternatively from subservience to precedence by diachronic semantical variations. On the one hand, historical study of the object of comparison in law reveals dissonant epistemologies challenging the relevance of the expression ‘comparative law’. This discipline occupying a marginal status throughout a major part of history gradually gained acceptance transitioning from a pure negation of the faculty to compare, to timid comparison of likeness, to acceptance of alterity. On the other hand, the formula’s remit is constantly challenged. Comparatists naturally concerned with the formulation of an objectivized methodological framework extending beyond tacit use may not rely on specialists focusing exclusively on theory and method whose undue appropriation resulted in a counterintuitive and detrimental complexification of the discipline. Despite salutary trends giving rise to the resurgence of a generalised interest in method collectively propelled by a scholarly direction resolutely departing from specialism, it is argued ‘Comparative Law Methodology’ is tautological.