Il problema della percezione tra Husserl, Merleau-Ponty e Rosmini

Abstract

The Problem of Perception in Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, and Rosmini 

The focus of this paper is the philosophical problem of perception. It will compare some of the most important voices of contemporary phenomenological tradition with some aspects of the philosophical anthropology of Antonio Rosmini. We will examine the phenomenological reflection of Edmund Husserl, showing how his concept of perception is not adequate to stay in a truly human dimension of subjectivity. Moreover, the phenomenology of perception of Maurice Merleau-Ponty will be taken into consideration, as a more legitimate way to operate a comparison with some specific aspects of Rosmini’s philosophical anthropology. Therefore, the paper will proceed to analyze Rosmini’s Anthropology in the Service of Moral Science, with special emphasis on the section «Animality». The aim is to highlight the presence of a strong anthropological conception of perception, that on the one side goes beyond the transcendentalist approach of Husserl’s phenomenology, and on the other side is also appropriate to overcome the existential phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty.