Fra immanenza e trascendenza: una contraddizione? Il rapporto pensiero-realtà nella metafisica di F. H. Bradley

Giulio Cavalli

doi:10.15168/2385-216X/2533

Between Immanence and Transcendence: A Contradiction?

The Thought-Reality Relationship in the Metaphysics of F. H. Bradley

Authors

Giulio Cavalli Università di Parma

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.15168/2385-216X/2533

Keywords:

thought, reality, contradiction, immanence, transcendence, relation, metaphysics, epistemology

Abstract

In Appearance and Reality (1893), F. H. Bradley held that reality is both immanent to thought (as a known object) and transcendent to it (as non-relational in structure). This cohabitation of intellectualism and anti-intellectualism in his metaphysics was relevantly attacked by J. Dewey (1907) as being self-contradictory. The goal of my essay is to defend Bradley against this charge by elucidating the structure of the thought-reality relationship and the proper status of contradiction.